Keynes came to realise many decades later Barnett, , Thanks are due to two referees for their very useful suggestions. Barnett, Vincent. Catalysing Growth? Mendeleev and the Tariff. The Journal of European Economic History , 33 2 : Rieter, L. Shirokorad and J. Zweynert eds. Marburg: Metropolis. Bolkhovitinov, N. The Sale of Alaska. Polar Geography , 27 3 : Crisp, Olga. Studies in the Russian Economy before London: Macmillan. Gatrell, Peter. The Tsarist Economy, London: Batsford. Horn, A. Kahan, Arcadius.
Russian Economic History: the Nineteenth Century. Kipp, J. Reutern on the Russian State and Economy. The Journal of Modern History , 47 3 : Lampe, Markus. The Journal of Economic History , 69 4 : Laue, Theodore H. Sergei Witte and the Industrialization of Russia. New York, NY: Atheneum. Lieven, Dominic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mendeleev, Dmitrii I. Mitchell, B. European Historical Statistics, Mosse, W. An Economic History of Russia, London: Tauris. Owen, Thomas. The Corporation under Russian Law, Raffalovich, Arthur.
Russian Financial Policy, Economic Journal , 26 : Reutern, Mikhail Kh. Memorandum on Tariff Reform in Russia. O merakh po uluchsheniyu finansovogo i ekonomicheskogo polozheniya gosudarstva. Shepelev ed. Petersburg: Liki Rossii. Seton-Watson, Hugh. The Russian Empire, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Sobolev, M. Its criterion is not science or technology, but a change in the economic or social environment, a change in the behavior of people as consumers or producers, as citizens, as students or as teachers, and so on.
Innovation creates new wealth or new potential of action rather than new knowledge. I have always had the feeling that the collapse of the USSR was not only due to the sheer cost of the arms-race with the USA, which many commentators seem to think is the case. Is that innovative? Or incremental? The term National Technology Initiative clearly puta an emphasis on technology. But, there was serious intent behind this burger example. This leads to the obvious question of how to measure the possible demand before you start-up as a verb your start-up as a noun!
Quite a bit has been written about this issue,  and I will not delve in to this issue here in any depth. This is usually found in markets that are growing quickly and full of competition eg self-driving cars. But usually there is a reason the market is empty. It still may be a good business opportunity ….
Remember, Google was late to the search-engine party, not early. So, does the product meet market demand, or does the product create the market? For a good long time, sometimes for years, there is only effort and no results.
Long Read: 20 Years of Russia's Economy Under Putin, in Numbers - The Moscow Times
The first results are then usually meager. The outstanding example may be the steam-driven ship. By its superiority was clearly established; but it did not replace the sailing ship until fifty years later. It becomes within a few short years a new major industry or a new major product line and market. But until it has reached that point it cannot be predicted when it will take off, nor indeed whether it ever will.
Timing can be lucky or unlucky. For example, the first steam trains depended on advances on metallurgy to enable railway lines that were strong enough to support their great weight.
Log in to Wiley Online Library
Create a product, ship it, and see how it does, design and implement improvements, and push it back out. The companies that are fastest at this process will win. The basis for success then, and for continual product excellence, is speed. And nine out of every ten ideas which, after thorough analysis, seem to be worthwhile and feasible turn out to be failures or, at best, puny weaklings. Innovative strategy therefore aims at creating a new business rather than a new product within an already established line.
It aims at creating new performance capacity rather than improvement. What is significantly different is not a technical decision. It is not the quality of science that makes the difference. It is not how expensive an undertaking it is or how hard it is to bring it about.
The significant difference lies in the impact on the environment. The first applications are rarely the applications that, in the end, will turn out to be the really important ones. Learn from your mistakes. Any failed project will yield valuable technical, user, and market insights that can help inform the next effort. For example, of the inaugural class of 14 teams at Area in September selected from more than applicants , we expect half to fail within 6 months. If the innovative product idea is not working out, do not be afraid to abandon it.
And, it should not be forgotten that some of the information and ideas from the failed product, might be very useful for a new product. You may have noticed that my article on the National Technology was quite dismissive of the NTI — at least in the way that it was being promoted at that time! The rapid changes in technology make this selection process very difficult — and mistakes can be very costly. Would the arbiter of only a few years ago have designated Nokia and Research in Motion manufacturer of the BlackBerry as national champions if they had been Russian companies?
The last thing that Russia needs is some government officials, no matter what their good intentions may be — making such decisions about which innovation projects to spend money and other resources on. So, maybe the Russian government is moving a little closer to my point of view. Chinese bureaucracy, and the desire for government control, does impeded the adoption of innovative technologies in many areas. But, China has had the advantage of a rapidly increasing consumer market — and competition for it can be an enormous driver of innovation.
The Chinese consumer has been allowed to receive many innovative products, particularly those associated with the Internet. In Russia, lower income growth and a more comprehensive bureaucracy — generally based on the period of the 3 rd industrial revolution — seems to impede the adoption of contemporary technologies. In general, apart from limited areas associated with national defense issues, the best approach of government to innovation is to get out of the way as much as possible — that is, do not try to pick winners! Governments should not try to stop use of new innovations just to protect some existing interest group!
But Government does have a role to protect IP and to ensure that innovations are not abused for dishonest and anti-competition purposes. For governments, the rules for an innovative society are two-fold:. Firstly, get out of the way.
Obstacles to Economic Reform
Russia and China need to reduce the extent including number of forms and people involved in controlling what happens in society. This is the case at any official level. The other theme is the more rational desire to secure its border areas by maximizing influence over its neighbors, and in particular countries of the former Soviet Union. In the face of actual and mooted NATO expansion, this was the prime motivator for the annexation of Crimea and the support of separatists in eastern Ukraine.
India has little to offer Russia, apart from being a second-rank participant in its ideas about Eurasia or Greater Eurasia and as a buyer of Russian military and nuclear power equipment. Russia clearly, and logically, puts more emphasis on its relationship with China than with India. India, in recent years, has mainly been seen as a market for Russian military equipment and civilian nuclear technology. However, there are also signs that India growing ambitions, as evidenced in Russian eyes by the Quad, are leading to some refocus on India. Putin also referred to this issue several times at the May Belt and Road Summit in Beijing.
Is there to be a new age of Eurasian economic and power primacy? The central Eurasian geographical area is not easy to define, but its importance to the world is immense. Central Eurasia is thus a mix of countries and parts of countries, ranging from very small to very large, whose relationships with each other do not always have a happy history.
All these countries have both economic and security issue at stake in central Eurasian developments, and it is not always easy or even possible to disentangle these. This book mainly concentrates on the economic issues and does so by way of examining the most important international institutional arrangements and integration ideas impacting on the central Eurasian geographical space. These are presently dominated by Russia and China, but some changes are underway. The first two countries are not considered part of central Eurasia, and only make a brief appearance in this book.
Such a division of labor would seem to ultimately put China at the mercy of Russian security interests, and so it would be less keen than Russia on such an allocation of roles. This book starts by looking at the general Russia-China relationship because this will largely determine how all other events unfold. Fourthly, the relationship between China and Central Asia is considered.
Fifthly, the SCO is considered. It also concludes with a view about future developments in this part of the world. The analysis laid out in this book suggests that such attempts will have little success. There are a number of reasons. The joint report by analysts from the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies, Valdai Discussion Club, and the Kazakhstan Council of International Relations released in early July might have been expected to result in a clearer understanding of many of the issues that have already been discussed in this text — but it does not! On the positive side, the report is not afraid to point the finger at some very specific problems and at those who are responsible for them.
Domestic aspects of this include boosting the economic prospects of Xinjiang and other western provinces of China and possibly contributing to reducing over-capacity in various heavy industry sectors.
Externally, China wants a secure western rear to its eastern flank which borders on various international contested seas and exposed trade routes. The SREB, whether through Central Asian countries or Pakistan, gives China alternative routes for imports of energy and, to a lesser extent, exports of manufactured goods and industrial capacity. The EAEU is being held together by Russian will-power and may well survive in its present imperfect form for some time. Even if it can attract one or two new members such as Tajikistan during the next few years, it will eventually fade because of its own internal contradictions and because its Central Asian country members will increasingly see their future connected to closer relations with China.
Moreover — in the view of this author — it would be almost impossible for this to occur with the involvement of the SCO. All this makes for a very messy meal! But even a messy meal is a meal, and in the absence of anything else might be consumed if there is sufficient hunger to do so. There is simply no agreed appetite among the counties of central Eurasia to change the above trends.
Russia and China are the main players in the context of this book, and will remain so for many years because the other possible main player, India, has neither the Russian historical involvement nor the Chinese financial power to force any significant change in the outlook. However, the Russia-China relationship is not deep for a variety of reasons, and shows little sign of becoming so.
Russia sees them in its potential entry to Asian markets and building up trade with EAEU nations, in luring investments in infrastructure projects in Siberia and Far East. China prefers large-scale investments in external infrastructure and gaining access to new natural resources.
Why the economic reform succeeded in China & will fail in Russia
It suggests that after so much discussion there is a broad limited understanding about the Greater Eurasia idea within Eurasia itself. In reality, Vladimir Putin and many influential Russian analysts mainly regard Greater Eurasia as a geo-political concept to reduce the power of the US and build a multi-polar world. The economic growth aspects are secondary. Putting these trade, security and geo-political factors together allows us to see that the basic reasons for the EAEU and the Belt and Road are different. China, however, launched its Belt and Road as a way of taking further advantage of globalization and in the process boosting its own security.
The July meeting between Presidents Putin and Xi in Moscow seems to have resulted in little more than motherhood-type statements. The Russia-China relationship as it now exists is mainly the creature of the relationship between Presidents Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping and whatever difficulties both countries are having in their external security environments. Baring health issues, it would seem that Putin and Xi will remain the most powerful figures in their countries into the early s. Both see themselves as historical figures leading the rejuvenation of their countries.
Both want to use international economic relations to boost the power and prestige of their countries, although the way that they go about this is not the same. For a variety of reasons Xi is likely to be more successful in the international arena than Putin. If nothing else, demographics and the catch-up aspect of economic development that benefits China make this almost inevitable.
But, it is also clearly the case that China is showing a much defter hand on the international public relations PR front and acts to avoid unnecessary conflict, whereas Russia seems to bask in such conflict. While domestic policies have been little more than touched upon in this book, it is not clear that either Xi or Putin will ultimately put economic effectiveness ahead of domestic political goals.
This will spill-over into international relations and will slow the development of closer economic ties between Russia and China because non-political business decision makers will much prefer to deal with countries where business is less political. While much of the future of the central Eurasian area will be determined by the relationship between Putin and Xi, there is also ultimately a third player, in the form of the child-like Donald Trump and the self-important policies of the USA.
If Putin and Xi are attracted to each other, it is the US that has pushed them into their embrace. If the US removed such pressure, the present leader-centric Russia-China relationship would quickly show sign of fatigue due to the absence of support from more fundamental deep ties between the two countries and due to their competition in the central Eurasian region. In the meantime, China seems in no hurry to change present circumstances and trends in central Eurasia because it has the upper hand, and will continue to pay lip-service to ideas of greater cooperation with Russia in order to prevent it playing a SREB spoiling role.
Summers Charles W. Return to Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. Related R. Katz and Olivier Blanchard. Related Books. Imperial Gamble By Marvin Kalb. Lawrence H.
Related Russian Economic Reform
Copyright 2019 - All Right Reserved